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Speech:† Unconscious Parallelism: Constitutional Law 
in Canada and the United States 
Justice John C. Major* 
While I was honoured to be invited to speak to you today, this 
feeling was tempered by a concern about what to speak about. The 
content problem comes from my own experience. Early in my 
litigation practice, I progressively reached the conclusion that judges 
were not the best source on the law. Another group that shares that 
view are the court’s law clerks. 
So when choosing a topic to speak about I took into account the 
fact that this audience would be law students and academics—a 
group that, while tolerant, would not be too forgiving of carelessness, 
which presents a challenge. With that in mind, I thought a safe route 
would be a comparison of the Supreme Court of Canada with the 
Supreme Court of the United States. On that basis, I may be seen as 
being right at least half of the time. In highlighting some of the 
differences between the two courts and countries, there is no 
suggestion that either system is superior but that, by different routes, 
both have nurtured democracies that are examples to the world. 
As neighbours, we share not only the border but essentially 
common values and beliefs. As well, the Supreme Court in each 
country is viewed as the ultimate protector of rights. Today I will 
outline some of our constitutional differences and use freedom of 
expression as an example of how we seem to arrive at an arguably 
satisfactory result by different means. There is a difference of opinion 
on the application of freedom of expression, yet each country 
considers it a basic and fundamental right. In part, the variance in 
 † Delivered at Washington University School of Law on October 20, 2004. Minimal 
footnotes have been added by the editorial staff of the Washington University Journal of Law & 
Policy. 
 * Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario. 
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approach is directly related to our citizen’s perception of 
governments. To what extent is the government friend or foe? 
The United States and its Constitution was created with the 
ringing affirmation of Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence1 after 
an armed revolution against the oppressive British government. By 
contrast, Canadian independence evolved through a series of 
legislative actions. In fact, the British North America Act of 18672 
was only an act passed by the British parliament, but this served to 
grant Canada independence. No doubt the British government’s 
willingness to grant increasing amounts of sovereignty to its 
remaining colonies was influenced by their earlier defeats in the 
United States. 
This difference in our respective creations explains in part the 
view of government that our citizens have. The American view, 
formed by revolution, an armed fight for freedom from an oppressive 
government, is that governments are subservient to the citizens and 
they retain a suspicion of what and why government acts as it does. 
By contrast, Canada’s relatively painless evolutionary constitutional 
development has resulted in a more trusting view of government. 
This may account for the general preference of Americans at large to 
want to be left alone to solve their problems, while the Canadian 
usual reaction to problems is to turn to the government for solutions. 
Article III of your Constitution calls for the creation of a Supreme 
Court, and defines the matters over which that court has jurisdiction.3 
In Canada, the British North America Act (our Constitution) simply 
gives the power to the federal government to create a “General Court 
of Appeal for Canada.”4 One difference in the court’s role is that 
yours was born of the Constitution while ours was legislated.  
The Supreme Court of the United States began sitting in 1790 
shortly after the country came into being. In Canada the government 
waited eight years until 1875 before passing the legislation required 
to create the Supreme Court of Canada, and waited another seventy-
four years (1949) before eliminating appeals to the privy council in 
 1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
 2. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.). 
 3. U.S. CONST. art. III.  
 4. Constitution Act § 101. 
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England and making our Supreme Court the final Canadian court of 
appeal. Obviously, Canada felt no urgency, instilled in part by our 
painless gaining of independence. 
The foundation and form of the Canadian Constitution will 
illustrate some differences from America’s. Canada became 
independent by the British North America Act of 1867, which, as 
stated, is only an act of the English parliament but has been thought 
of as our Constitution. The important sections are sections 91 and 
92,5 which contain the division of powers between the legislatures of 
the provinces (states) and the federal government. Unlike the U.S., 
the residual power in Canada belongs to the federal government. You 
have achieved the same result by leaving the residual powers with the 
states, but by judicially interpreting the Commerce Clause6 to in fact 
create a more powerful federal government here than in Canada. 
In 1982, we adopted a Charter of Rights,7 which parallels your 
Bill of Rights. However, there are three significant differences. The 
first difference is section 1, which provides that “[t]he Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms 
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law 
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”8 
Thus, the government can act in a manner inconsistent with a right or 
freedom guaranteed by the Charter so long as that governmental 
action can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
The second difference is section 24(2), which provides that: 
Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes 
that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or 
denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the 
evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having 
regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the 
proceedings would bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute.9 
 5. Constitution Act §§ 91, 92. 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 7. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982, pt. I, Canada Act, 
1982, ch. 11, sched. B (U.K.). 
 8. Id. § 1. 
 9. Id. § 24(2). 
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This is an interesting provision because evidence obtained in a 
manner, which violates a Charter right is not automatically excluded. 
Rather, it is only excluded under section 24(2) if it can be shown by 
the prosecution that, having regard to all of the circumstances, the 
admission of that evidence would (or could) bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute. 
Finally, section 33 provides a legislative override whereby the 
federal or provincial government can declare that an act shall operate 
notwithstanding certain Charter rights.10 Therefore, in addition to the 
limitation found in section 1, certain Charter rights and freedoms are 
subject to the legislative override in section 33, or, as it is sometimes 
called, “the notwithstanding clause.” This override provision is 
limited to only certain rights and freedoms. It can be used to override 
the Charter’s equality rights, legal rights, and the fundamental 
freedoms of expression, religion, association, and assembly. It does 
not extend to mobility rights nor democratic rights. As well, a section 
33 override will only remain in effect for a period of five years, 
unless renewed. 
Some commentators have seen this provision as a reconciliation 
between entrenched rights and the tradition of parliamentary 
supremacy. Others have said that section 33 can lead to a tyranny of 
the majority, and with that there is no Constitution. Experience has 
shown that the feared tyranny has not occurred. To date, no federal 
government has relied on section 33 and it is considered a death knell 
if it did.  
The mere mention of section 33 can arouse a public outcry. For 
example, in 1998, the government of Alberta suggested that it would 
use section 33 to protect legislation, which would limit compensation 
available to victims of a forced sterilization scheme. However, this 
suggestion drew widespread criticism and the government 
subsequently withdrew its proposal. Therefore, for the time being at 
least, we can say that section 33 lays dormant. 
It has also been suggested that the present U.S. Constitution has 
provisions that may have operated similarly to Canada's section 33. 
This suggestion was raised in an article in the Michigan Law Review, 
 10. Id. § 33. 
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which compared section 33 of the Canadian Charter with the 
provisions of the U.S. Constitution authorizing Congress to control 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts, including the Supreme Court.11 
Although these provisions are structurally different, the author argued 
that the U.S. provisions “[b]roadly interpreted . . . might foreclose 
judicial consideration of constitutional challenges to legislation, just 
as section 33 does.”12 However, as I understand it, the American 
power to regulate jurisdiction has never really served as a significant 
limit on the power of judicial review.  
I should also note in passing that section 35 of the Charter 
constitutionally recognizes and affirms existing aboriginal and treaty 
rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada.13 Unfortunately, after 
more than twenty years the reconciliation of difficulties has not been 
resolved by section 35, in spite of hopes to the contrary. 
The fact that the founders of Canada were willing to leave it to the 
federal government to pass a law to create a Supreme Court while the 
founders of this country felt it was necessary to entrench the 
existence of such an institution in the Constitution itself is further 
demonstration of the different levels of trust in government. 
Regardless of the form of our relative births there is no doubt that 
both courts are, are seen to be, and act as a third level of government, 
a task performed independently and not always to the satisfaction of 
the government. 
Both courts have nine judges appointed by the federal 
government. Unlike your court, we have mandatory retirement at age 
seventy-five. I must say that the arguments usually used to support 
mandatory retirement, particularly those about diminishing mental 
capacity, become less persuasive to me as seventy-five approaches.  
The appointment process is different. In Canada, the Prime 
Minister’s appointments of judges are not subject to the consent of 
Parliament. The media would prefer your public hearings. Our new 
Prime Minister has expressed interest in the media’s insistence on a 
 11. Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative 
Illumination of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV. 245, 274–97 (1995). 
 12. Id. at 285. 
 13. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 35. 
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public hearing. The critics of reform say why fix a non-existent 
problem.  
The present system, while not public, involves wide consultation 
by the Justice Department prior to the Prime Minister’s selection. A 
serious problem with public hearing is to avoid the extremes of 
personality and yet acquaint the public with the proposed nominee. 
An attempt to do this was recently made with the last two 
appointments. In spite of various parliamentary commissions, the 
upshot was that the appointment was made as usual by the Prime 
Minister, and the Minister of Justice then went before a parliamentary 
committee to explain the choice. This hybrid process did not satisfy 
anyone. However, the Prime Minister has said this is just the 
beginning. As I am likely the next to retire from the Court, my 
replacement may be the product of the new method of selection. Even 
allowing for improvement in process, it is hard for me to imagine an 
improvement in quality. 
Despite the differences in the creation and appointment process of 
judges, both courts are watch-dogs required to determine when the 
executive or the legislative branch of the government has erred or 
exceeded their jurisdiction. The actual work of both courts is very 
similar. Here, a litigant files a “petition for certiorari,” and the Court 
has control over which cases are heard. In Canada, the Supreme 
Court is a court of general jurisdiction and the parties file an 
“application for leave.” In each court, leave to appeal must be 
obtained. As it is thought that work expands to fill the time available, 
consider that the United States Supreme Court receives 
approximately 7000 applications and we get close to 700, yet both 
hear about seventy to one hundred cases a year.  
While differences exist between us, we share common values but 
come to conclusions in different ways. An example of that is freedom 
of expression. Both of us value freedom of expression. It is properly 
viewed as a cornerstone of a free society. Both countries are in favor 
of unrestricted use of that freedom, particularly for those ideas with 
which they agree. For those views with which they disagree, 
restrictions might be more palatable. 
The power of words, ideas, and images has been repeatedly 
demonstrated throughout history, as has the violent opposition that 
has greeted those ideas that challenge the status quo. Numerous 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/10














examples exist, from the treatment of Socrates’ criticism of the gods, 
to the assassination of Martin Luther King for his views on civil 
liberties. While the first person to challenge existing views has often 
suffered and perished for their efforts, the power of their ideas lives 
on. Galileo was forced to recant his theories of astronomy during his 
lifetime, but astronomers have since relied on his correct ideas. There 
is no doubt that freedom of expression fosters ideas and changes. 
Debate ensues, new ideas emerge, and our democracies improve. The 
challenging question is whether any limits on freedom of expression 
should be allowed? And if so, what limits? 
The courts of both countries have said yes—some limits are 
acceptable. But the location and extent of those limits varies, not only 
between countries, but over time within each country. The framework 
within which each court addresses these questions may, in part at 
least, be traced back to the different views of government that I spoke 
of earlier. 
In the United States, freedom of expression is protected by the 
first amendment. Passed in 1791, it provides: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government 
for a redress of grievances.14 
In Canada, freedom of expression was historically protected only by 
the common law. In 1982, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
became part of our Constitution and section 2 reads in part: 
“Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (a) freedom of 
conscience and religion; (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and 
expression, including freedom of the press and other means of 
communications.”15 As can be seen from those two sections, the 
approach to protecting that right in the two countries is different. In 
Canada, the right is given to the citizens, while in the United States, 
you limit the power of Congress to take away that right.  
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
 15. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 2.  
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In assessing the legislative differences, section 1 of the Canadian 
Charter, which I mentioned earlier, enables the government to take an 
action that infringes a right or freedom so long as the impugned act 
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
Section 1 has played a role in Canadian jurisprudence on freedom of 
expression. 
Hate speech is a particular aspect of freedom of expression that is 
dealt with differently by our respective courts. In the United States, 
the present approach of the Court is to say that government cannot 
ban certain types of speech based on their content. But this is a 
relatively recent development. As recently as 1952, the United States 
Supreme Court upheld16 an Illinois criminal group libel law which 
prohibited the exhibition in any public place of any publication 
portraying “criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of 
citizens, of any race . . . which . . . exposes [them] . . . to contempt 
[and] derision . . . or which is productive of breach of the peace or 
riots.” The categories of unprotected speech included the lewd and 
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or “fighting 
words,” words which cause harm or are likely to provoke a violent 
confrontation. 
But over time the U.S. Supreme Court has shifted its position on 
the limits that can be placed on hate speech. In 1978, the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Collin v. Smith17 struck down an 
ordinance forbidding the dissemination of any material promoting 
and inciting racial hatred. The Supreme Court refused to hear the 
appeal, and the result was that neo-Nazis were allowed to march 
through the predominantly Jewish village of Skokie. 
In 1992, your Supreme Court struck down the City of St. Paul’s 
“bias motivated crime ordinance” in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
Minnesota.18 The ordinance prohibited the display of a symbol that 
one knows “arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis 
of race, color, creed, religion, or gender.” The person charged in that 
case had, with a group of friends, taped chair legs together into the 
form of a cross and then burned it in the back yard of a black family. 
 16. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
 17. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). 
 18. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
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In the decision for the court written by Justice Scalia, the fact that 
fighting words were not protected by the first amendment was 
recognized. However, Justice Scalia went on to hold that while a 
government could limit all fighting words, it could not selectively 
limit fighting words based on their content. He found that because the 
state had not limited all fighting words, but only those that offended 
particular groups, the ordinance was contrary to the first amendment. 
While innovative, I have trouble with this logic—that is my problem 
not Justice Scalia’s. The minority opinion would also have found the 
law contrary to the first amendment, but would have done so on the 
basis that it caught speech that only hurt feelings and therefore did 
not amount to fighting words. So, the majority thought the restriction 
was too narrow while the dissent found it too broad. 
It is significant that some forms of speech are not protected by the 
first amendment. It is clear that even as the court in R.A.V. was 
narrowing the limits that could be placed on expression, they were 
still not willing to concede that limits could never be placed on 
expression.  
In Canada, the jurisprudence on hate speech demonstrates how 
section 1 of the Canadian Charter, which allows a government to 
justify an infringement of a constitutionally protected right, has 
allowed the Canadian courts to develop a different approach to 
freedom of expression. The leading Canadian case regarding 
restrictions on hate speech is The Queen v. Keegstra,19 where the 
court was asked to review section 319 of our criminal code. That 
section made it an offense to “unlawfully” promote hatred. 
Keegstra was a rural high school teacher who described Jewish 
people as “revolutionist, treacherous imposters, sneaky, manipulative, 
money-loving and power hungry” in the high school history class he 
taught. He also denied the holocaust, saying it was a fraud. He gave 
good marks only to those students who repeated these views. 
Keegstra was charged under section 319 and convicted by a jury. 
However, the conviction was overturned by the Alberta Court of 
Appeals, which held that section 319 violated the guarantee of 
freedom of expression in the Charter.20 The Supreme Court of 
 19. [1990] S.C.R. 697. 
 20. [1988] 43 C.C.C.3d 150 
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Canada allowed the appeal and restored the conviction.21 The court 
held that section 319 did limit Keegstra’s right to free speech, but that 
the limit was justifiable under section 1. 
You will note that, unlike in the United States, the court did not 
need to linger on whether this type of speech was protected in the 
first place. In Canada, all expression that attempts to convey a 
meaning is protected by section 2(b).22 The Supreme Court of Canada 
is able to maintain this broad protection because section 1 provides 
an express method for the court to consider whether an infringement 
of rights is justified.23 In Keegstra, the majority of the court decided 
that the government had provided sufficient evidence to prove that 
the limit in question was justifiable in a free and democratic society. 
As these two cases demonstrate, the actual protection given to 
similar speech can vary between the two countries. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that both countries value freedom of expression as an important 
right. It is also clear that in both countries, the Supreme Court has 
accepted that some limits on this right will be allowed.  
The courts acknowledge these limits in different ways. In the 
United States, it is done by deciding that some expression was never 
intended to be protected by the first amendment, and limits are placed 
on the time, place, and manner of expression, but not on the content. 
In Canada, all expression that attempts to convey a meaning is 
protected, but the government can restrict a citizen’s right to that 
expression if can justify the limit. 
These differences have not gone unnoticed by the lawmakers in 
each country. One does not need to search long to find examples 
where a law before the court was clearly passed with previous 
freedom of expression jurisprudence in mind. 
Jurisprudence has followed that qualification. In Hill v. 
Colorado,24 the United States Supreme Court found a restriction of 
expression valid with respect to a law that restricted expression, but 
did not curtail it. The Canadian Supreme Court, by virtue of section 1 
 21. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.R. at 795-96. 
 22. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 2(b). 
 23. Id. § 1. 
 24. 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
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of the Charter, found little difficulty in recently restricting individual 
political spending during an election campaign.25 
CONCLUSION 
Canada and the United States took different paths on the road to 
sovereignty. This is reflected in the institutions we created to govern 
our countries and the protections from government action included in 
our Constitutions. But over time, our geographical proximity has 
overcome many of these differences and we have come to share 
many of the same values and beliefs. One of these embraced beliefs 
is in the rule of law. 
My goal today was to simply describe how two Supreme Courts, 
using different approaches, struggle with one of the many issues they 
face each year. I hope that it has been demonstrated that while the 
result in certain isolated cases may be different, the goal of each 
Supreme Court is the same. That goal is to allow the government the 
opportunity to govern, while protecting the citizens from laws that go 
beyond the jurisdiction of government. In striving towards this goal, 
courts are forced to balance competing interests in close cases where 
many find it difficult to say what is the right decision.  
But too much of this talk has been devoted to the courts. And 
while they are, in a manner of speaking, the last stop, the rule of law 
depends more directly on lawyers. That is the future of many of you, 
and I urge you to follow the many examples of the American bar and 
vigorously inform and courageously continue the struggle to ensure 
the quality of the law and that no one is above it. 
 25. Harper v. Canada, [2004] S.C.R. 827. 
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